IDF and Shin Bet knew at night of anomalies in Gaza; IDF investigation: Nova did not come up in discussions

According to IDF and Shin Bet investigations, activation of SIM cards in Gaza was reported to the IDF already on the evening of October 5, and according to IDF investigations, an additional activation detected from 9 p.m. on the night of October 6 was discussed until dawn, but the Nova party, where approximately 3,500 people were staying near the border, did not come up in night discussions.

The IDF approved the Nova party near Re'im on October 4, 2023, just two days before it opened, as emerges from an IDF investigation of Nova published April 3, 2025. According to ynet, the commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Division, Lt. Col. Haim Cohen, initially refused to approve a party with 3,500 participants four kilometers from the Gaza border (according to Times of Israel, about five kilometers) on a weekend when he had fewer soldiers than usual due to holiday leave, and the event was approved after conversations with the division and Southern Command; according to the investigation, "no one pressured the battalion commander to approve the party." The investigation found that the party "was indeed approved according to procedures," but without advance situation assessments, without updating forces in the sector about its existence, without designating it as a vital asset for an operational event and without examining infiltration routes to it, and soldiers deployed at the border on the morning of October 7 did not know that more than 3,500 people were near Re'im. According to N12 and Israel Hayom, the investigation found that the existence of the party was known to the Gaza Division commander and the Southern Command commander, while according to Times of Israel, the request was handled by mid-level officers and most senior commanders were not asked.

According to an IDF investigation of the night before the October 7 massacre, published February 27, 2025, several SIM cards were activated as early as October 5, and at 9 p.m. on October 6, Shin Bet detected activation of several Israeli SIM cards in the hands of Hamas Nukhba operatives; a Shin Bet representative updated on WhatsApp the intelligence officers of the Gaza Division and Southern Command. At 9:30 p.m. they updated Gaza Division commander Col. Avi Rozenfeld and Southern Command chief Yaron Finkelman, and half an hour later, at 10 p.m., the Nova party opened. In an affidavit submitted by Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar to the Supreme Court on April 21, 2025, it was written that Gaza Division commander, division intelligence and Southern Command operations officer were updated by phone about anomalies detected on October 6, 2023 at 11 p.m. According to the IDF investigation, calls between command and division intelligence and Shin Bet continued until 11:30 p.m.

A Shin Bet investigation, published in March 2025, adds that the first indication of SIM activation in northern Gaza was distributed to relevant IDF bodies already on the evening of October 5. According to that investigation, a summary of the intelligence picture of the southern sector, distributed around 1 a.m., described "a sequence of signs that seriously point to Hamas emergency preparations," but assessed that Hamas did not want an escalation. Bar wrote in his affidavit that the anomaly "was incorrectly assessed as Hamas routine for Israeli action and more seriously as preparation for a targeted raid attack," and that at 1:33 a.m. Southern Command chief was updated by phone about the decision to send a combined designated force of Shin Bet operatives and Naval Commando fighters. By 4:30 a.m., approximately 45 SIM cards were gradually activated, compared to 38 during the Tishrei holidays 2022 and 37 in Ramadan 2023, and according to Shin Bet investigation, the information was incorrectly analyzed also because of the comparison to Tishrei 2022, when similar activation of similar scope ended "in nothing."

At 3:03 a.m., Shin Bet distributed to the IDF, police and Civil Administration an alert about activity of the 'SIM network' in several Hamas brigades. According to the wording, 'we do not have information about the nature of the activity,' but it is an 'unusual accumulation' that 'given additional indicators could indicate a Hamas attack activity.' According to Shin Bet investigation, the alert enabled raising alert level and changing preparations in the sector, but 'did not indicate the scope of the attack and its timing.' Bar wrote in his affidavit that 'the alert level was incorrect and constitutes a Shin Bet failure,' and in that affidavit claimed that 'on the night of October 7, it was Shin Bet that alerted the entire system.'

In Bar's affidavit it was written that at 3:12 a.m. a discussion took place headed by Southern Command chief, in which operational directives were given to military forces. According to IDF investigation, Finkelman held between 3:15 and 3:50 a.m. a situation assessment with Gaza Division commander, intelligence officers and two senior Shin Bet representatives, and all four intelligence officers assessed that what was developing was not imminent; the most serious scenario discussed was infiltration of 70 Nukhba operatives from 2 to 8 points along the border. At 3:20 a.m., IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi was updated at his home and wrote on a note: "First of all, don't convince ourselves that this is nothing," and in a conversation with Finkelman between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. ordered to increase monitoring of Hamas and hold a new situation assessment at 8:30 a.m., or earlier if new information was received. At 4:30 a.m., Bar convened a situation assessment with heads of sectors at Shin Bet headquarters, and according to Shin Bet investigation, raised to severity in it "a point surprise in a raid/abduction format."

According to IDF investigation, the commanders did not order a significant change in alert level, with emphasis on alert with dawn: sector battalion commanders were updated, but brigade commanders and staff were not, and no further action was taken for fear of exposing intelligence sources in Gaza. According to Times of Israel, after the situation assessment, Finkelman sent along with Shin Bet a Tekila team to the border, and at 4 a.m. ordered Lt. Col. Haim Cohen to return from end-of-week leave; according to Israel Hayom, the team was deployed even before the situation assessment set for 3 a.m., and in Bar's affidavit the decision to send a combined force of Shin Bet and Naval Commando was reported to the command chief already at 1:33 a.m. The investigation team found that "enhanced alert preparations could have been performed without risking sources," but added: "there was no negligence that night, but yes that same perceptual rigidity." According to Haaretz exposure from September 2025, Lt. Col. Cohen arrived at the party site about an hour before the massacre began and told officers that he saw the unusual number of revelers while only two police patrol vehicles secured them, and according to the newspaper, "despite the alerts, he did not check whether it was worth continuing the party."

According to IDF investigation of Nova, no one from the Gaza Division, not even battalion commander Cohen, mentioned the existence of the party in the nightly situation assessments, no decision was made about it, and the existence of the mass party "was not raised up in the IDF at any stage until 10 a.m. on October 7." The investigation found that the fact that the continuation of the party was not raised in the division situation assessment on the night of the attack was "an error," and that "deep discourse on the subject might have led to a decision to close the party." A different version was heard in a recording from December 2024 that aired on Kan: head of investigation team, Lt. Col. (Res.) Ido Mizrahi, told police that the party "comes up in the conversation like the rest of the things" and no decision was made to evacuate it, but noted in that conversation "I did not sit in the conversation and I also did not investigate the night"; IDF spokesman then responded that in the Chief of Staff's situation picture "the Nova party was not raised" and that the investigation had not yet been completed. The Turkel Commission determined in November 2025 that the Nova investigation was inherently flawed, because it did not decide between the policies and authorities of the IDF and the police.

An internal Shin Bet investigation, whose details were published in Haaretz in December 2025, found that the organization did not know about the Nova festival on the morning of October 7, even though a Shin Bet representative participated at least twice in coordination meetings on the party, and the information was not transferred to authorized levels in the service leadership. According to Haaretz (March 2025), the police did not know on that morning that Naval Commando forces were deployed to early morning near the perimeter along with Tekila forces of Shin Bet, and according to police intelligence division investigation, whose details were published in Haaretz (October 2025), the 3:03 a.m. alert was received by police only at 7:03 a.m., after the attack broke out; at Shin Bet they emphasize that the information was transferred and received in real time. The one who was southern district commander in police, Chief Superintendent Amir Cohen, said in a recording that aired on Kan: "we all made decisions without knowing there was a discussion at night, without knowing there was a situation assessment, without understanding at all that there was concern about infiltration, without knowing the story of the Tekila." Ofakim police station commander, Sergeant Major Nivi Ohana, who was the commander responsible for the party, said a month after the massacre: "the army approved the event and there were no unusual alerts."

At 6:29 a.m., with the beginning of Hamas attack, Ohana identified unusual rocket fire and ordered immediate evacuation of all revelers (according to Times of Israel, at 6:35 a.m.), and according to IDF investigation, without his decision "we would have had substantial likelihood of approximately 2,000 deaths from Nova and hundreds more captives just from the party." At 7:13 a.m. the division was updated that approximately 90 percent of the revelers had evacuated, information that later proved inaccurate, and at the division they mistakenly understood that the party had largely dispersed. A Nukhba platoon of approximately 100 to 110 operatives, which was heading to Nahal Oz and mistakenly turned around, identified the police checkpoint at 8:12 a.m. (according to Kan and Israel Hayom, at 8:10 a.m.), and Hamas operatives stormed the party site shortly after 9:15 a.m. according to Times of Israel (in ynet's timeline, the assault toward the site at 8:20 a.m. and final takeover of it at 8:50 a.m.). Only at 10 a.m. did operations branch at general staff begin to understand that there was a battle focus at the party, and organized military force arrived at the site for the first time at 11:20 a.m. according to ynet; according to Times of Israel, the first IDF forces arrived at 11:35 a.m.

According to IDF investigation, in the massacre at the Nova party 344 civilians and 34 security personnel were killed, and 44 were abducted to Gaza; according to Kan, 397 civilians, soldiers, police and Shin Bet operatives were killed. The one who filled the position of Negev sector commander in police on October 7, Chief Superintendent (Res.) Ayel Azulay, said: "If we had involved the police I would have dispersed the Nova party," and the festival producers said: "The investigation recognizes the fact that we were abandoned for long hours and proves that it was possible to save many more lives." Bar wrote in his affidavit, on the assessment of the time of the attack that night, that "no one assessed that such an attack would break out and certainly not on that same morning." The night investigation team at the IDF wrote that if the complete picture had been in the hands of one body, "it is likely that it would have been enough to generate an alert that would have shaken the system, but from the indicators it was not possible to know the scale of the invasion," and added: "On the night there was a rare opportunity for the IDF to correct years of complacency, and perhaps at least to disrupt the invasion."